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IKTROD UCTION 
Ths  paper is concerned with aspects of organization and procedure in nuclear accident 
management Because all midents mn be argued to have common characteristics, a a m p a m  
tive appmach is taken here for the discvssion of emergency planning for nuclear accidents. 
This approach reveals several defidendes in selected European emergency plans the most 
important anceming formal and informal communidon channels The mst important prin- 
ciple whch erneQes from this discussion and which was reinforced by the recent U.S. nud.ear 
&dent at T h e  Mile Island. is that planning efforts should be directed toward reducing the 
informahon Load &ed by earh p e m n  involv~d in managing an accident 
THE E\;OLUTION OF ACCIDENTS A N D  THEIR M A N A G E M E N T  
Recome is made hem to the lessons lemeci from the general field of technologi~ally 
d~sived &dents--sometimes referred to as man-made disasters. Firstly, because the mjority 
of  organizations w h i h  cornprise the i n f ~ ~ ~  for rx~magerner~t of accidents from outside 
the 'boundary fence" are largely identical for all accidents. Secondly, because a detailed study 
of a variety of technologically disparate &dents has shown that an woIutionary process associ- 
ated with serious &dents can be identified (Turner 1978). Though no substantial caserecord 
for major nudear &dents exist? there is no a p-bi reason to suppose that this kchnology 
should not show these same general features. Indeed. the recprd of those few nuclear d d e n t s  
which have occumd, supports this hypothesis. 
Ths  recznt examination of the origins of 86 man-made disasters stresses a broad contex- 
tual fmmework corltainirlg the following six p h i ~ e s  
-- an incubation period; 
-- a precipitahng went; 
-- the onset of effects or oonsequences; 
-- rescue and salvage; and 
-- ful l  systemic readjustment to the surprise assodated with the precipitatq ~ J A  
Man-made disasters do not originate overnight; it is rare that one individual, by virtue of 
a W l e  error can cause an accident in a syst,em formerly believed to be relatively s e m .  Thus 
it is aucial that the ind~at iaperiod not be overlooked in antidpa- accidents. 
In examining the -sent pluzse, lnforrnation management is seen to play a criti- 
cal role. Informahon may not be completely appreciated because individuals groups, or insEtu- 
tions have a false sense of seauity or vulnerabiiLity when f e d  with danger signs P r e m  of 
work for other diskdions draw their attention avwy fmm the emerging signs of danga: They 
may d i shs t  the sounz from which the warning comes They are sometimes decoyed into con- 
centrahg upon one property of a phenomenon and so relegatmg its other features D iffidties 
arise, too, in dassifying the phenomenon and in decidmg upon a suitable course of action 
A seamd general pmblem con- the organization e f i ency  of the respnding institu- 
tion Part of the effectiveness of any organization lies in the way it is able to involve its 
members with wfllcient similarity of approach outlook and piorities to operate more ef ien t ly  
than would a group of unorganized individuals. Yet, there remains the danger of oollective 
blinkers maslang important issues referred to by advocates of numerical risk analyses a s  'We 
rogue went  " 
D ismpant events may go unnoticed or be misunderstood as a result of p-oblerns in han- 
d h g  information in mmplex situations. There may be an oversupply of information, the cru- 
aal messages may be concealed in a mass of noise or those handlug the messages rnay be busy 
or preoccllpied with other matters. There are further problems of obtaining adequate intelli- 
g e n e  avoiding its dispatch to the m n g  peo@e, woiduq dishction in transmission. arvoiding 
the failure to operate on messages or to rely too heady on informal networks. A chronic p b  
lern concerns the individual in an o.rganization who has received all the necessary information 
about a problem, but who fails to deal with i t  Since the recipient may be swamped with infor- 
d o n  those attemp- to c o d -  should beware of pmvidmg him with all the fads in 
order to avoid the responsibility of being selective. This idea is a pre-requisite to a good 
management structure wen in non-aisis situations 
NUCLEAR ACCIDENT PHYSIOGNOMY 
Nudear acddents can be desuibed as following the sequence oi phases listed above. For 
each phase, it is useful to idenbfy the groups of individuals who are involved. 
In d e s u i b i  the unfoldmg of events constitu- an accident in the nuclear field, "nor 
rnal" operations consists of a series of readJustments by plant and operators to datively minor 
deviations from the presupposed and designed flow of operation Beclause of this readjustrrlent 
sequence, or b e c a ~  the aberrant went  is hidden w i h n  the operation pakkm, the response of 
either nxxhrusrn or operator is either non-existant, inadequate, or inoppoI.tune thus the 
Incubation Phase. I t  follows that a fault sequence is set in hain. This sequence may or may 
not according to the natural laws governing the process pmceed towards an undesired outcome 
(e.g., the overheahg of the reactor a r e ,  relese of radic-active material, dispersion of this 
&rial, etc). This event may or may not be perceived by the opeding staff. 
The Preapltahnn Ph-e (Phase 111 of the mident) is generally chmcterized by a 
response of the mecharurn or of the o p e  staff to the developing situation Ths  response 
unll o m  with v w  degrees of propriety and timeliness and will modify to a greater or lesser 
degr~e the course and outcome of the incident The fourth phase of the nudear acddent is the 
apparent or explicit manifestation of the accident in terms of events external to the plant or 
process which menance the opemhon itself, the plant itself or individuals within the plant 
boundaries or external to the boundaries This is termed the resultmg-effects phase 
Such typology allows us to develop a categorization of the involved groups as related to 
the sequence of events While such a desuiption has a useful role to play in organizing 
thoughts and opinions on the ideal course of institutional response, it obscures certain vital 
issues. These include: 
(i) the difficulties of allowing for uncertainties in the analysis of inaomplete information 
(ii) the question of what level of information is useful to the nudear plan operator and 
to the external bodies; 
(iii) the level of autonomy that must be allowed to e d  of the actors 
(iv) the assmphon in most emergency procedures of rational behavior by operators 
under stress 
(v) the lwel of basic knowledge required by the IXES and others to interpret m f o m  
tion; and 
(vi) the c o d  locus of decision for major responses (piz&culariy that of population wa- 
d o n  and the balancing of potential added  rid^ in exem- emergency pm- 
~ d u r e s  external to the plant). 
Though much can be gained by viaving nuclear acddents as havhg chamcteristics in c o n  
mon with a broad range of natual and man-made disasters. it is also important to recognize that 
whch is unique to nudear &dents and the readion of the public to them Otway (1978) p m  
vides a number of insights into the uniqueness of the risks fmm nudear power. 
RESPONSE TO A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
With this general background we turn to a disassion of the p l m  for nuclear accident 
management in various European countries. Specfically, we examine the emergency plans 
recommended by the Inkmational A tornic Energy Agency (1979), with additional references to 
plans of the Netherlands (Baas, et aL 1980), the United Kingdom (M atthews et al. 1980). and 
the Federal Republic of G ermany (von G adaw 1980). 
In the recent IAEA document on 'Planning for Off-Site Response to Radiahon Aoidents 
in Nudear FariLitieS' it is stated that the unequivocal responsibility for the initial assessment of 
an &dent situation-at a. nuclear facility rests with the operator. This guideline conoemhg the 
initial assessment of an &dent situation are followed by each of the three countries se1ed.d 
for study. In this resped the UK has the most detailed and comprehensive plan, where the 
lines of authority are clearly delineated from the moment an emergency is encountered 
After the operator has recognized and assessed a potential or &a1 emagency situation, 
the IA EA ( 1979) recommends an interndive response between on-site and off-site authorities. 
The uiaitical tasks for planning an emergency response include d e w  acddent seriousness 
that i s  deriding when to initiate what response, and drawing lines of resporxibility for mhng 
the a s e m n t s  and for canying out the interventive actions 
For this purpose, in the Netherlands a d i h d i o n  is made m n g  three broad acddent 
dilsses: 
(i) Accident Ciass 1: gaseous mdoactive releases above the licensed IIrnit are imminent 
or takzng place, but do not exoeed 10 times the value of this h u t  
(ii) Accident Class 2: gaseous radiodve releases e x c e w  a value of 10 hmes the 
licensed limit are imminent or talang place whereby the amount of releases mn still 
be approximately estimated 
(ii) Accident Class 3: the unhown amount of radioactive releases, imminent or red, is 
poinbng in the direction of a T o r  catastrophe. 
In some Empean counb-ies emergency plans are oriented to Accident Class 1 with an 
assumption that there will be amphe time between a release below 10 times the licensed h u t  
and a major release. A cwrding to the IAEA , there would be sufficient time after events initiat- 
ing a more serious release to inform off-site authorities so that they could, in tum, hpleinent 
pmtective measures prior to the start of any major relese to the environment 
The asslgrling of intervention levels based upon dose commitment is probably the mod 
lxghly debated issue in the subject of emergency planning. The Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), for example, equates in some detail dose levels with reammended interventive 
actions. In all cases, it is sigmficant that accidents are defined in t e r n  of dose commitment; 
the importance of a technical and administrative apparatus for obtaLIllnpl this data in the went 
of a nuclear emergency is apparent 
The IAEA m m m e n d s  that the operator of a nuclear facility set up an emergency 
response group. T h s  group should assurne the le- role in the on-site emergency response 
organization, pttcularly with regard to any liaison with the off-dte organization In the United 
Kingdom all emergency actions would be directed by an Emergency Tearn fmm an Emergency 
C o n h l  Center located at the station adminisbidion bl.o& backed up by a fully eqvipped center 
at a location off-site. A number of additional teams would also be formed to respond to the 
emugency. 
In the case of a nudear emergency there are two major respomibhties for off-site authori- 
ties: to wnduct off-site measurements of Mation levels, and to cany out interventive coun- 
temasures. In the early phases of an accident the emissions and meteomlogical data from 
the nuclear f-ty should be checked for consistency with the d a t i o n  levels measured on the 
outside. It is however, emphasized by the IAEA that the initial need to take pmtective meas- 
ures should not await this assessment but should be based upon recornendations of the facil- 
ity oprator. 
The IA EA document states that it is mandatory for off-site authorities to make anange- 
ments with the f d t y  operator to be provided with prediction of off-site consequenoes and 
recornmen&ons for protective measures. The ultimate responsibility for taking these m-,as- 
ures usually rests with the outside authorities--with the M ayor; of the affected rnunidpahties in 
the Nethedands with Public Services in the United Kmgdom, and with the Local authorities in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. The IAE.4 also recommends that an off-site governmental 
authority should provide for an Emeqency Response Organization that would ensure that the 
necessq plans are prepared and that the respnsible authority can cany out adion in the case 
of an emergency. 
The IAEA suggests further that procedures requk formal achowledgernents of orders 
and reports. A system for giving priority to emqency communications should be established 
In addition, emphasis is p l d  on the irnportanoe of ensuing that individuals and population 
gmups follow the instructions grven by the emergency response personnel dealing with the 
sitmiion. No mention is made howwer, of establishmg a well-understood vocabulary for corn 
munidmg the seriousness of the situation and for corn&- these instructions. 
In England and W ales there is a dire& telephone Link between the Emergency Conb l  
Room and the Grid Conh-ol System for off-site oqanizations; a further direct telephone link 
exlsts with the Public Relations Office, which has the function of issuing statements on the 
situahon in collaboration with the CEGB fieadquarters Press Offices To increase the chance 
that these emergency plans function smoothly, the U.K. Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 
requires that the nudear plant staff have a systematic tmmng course and that periodic emer 
gency drills be performed The Netherlands also appear to have an adecpate mrnrnunication 
system at least in terms of the technological links. There exist cable and radio connections 
includmg a number of reserved telephone lines. Again. however, no mention is made of 
developng unambiguous language or oode for ensuring that the human component of the sys 
tem functions adequahly. 
Though the racommended plms of the IAEA. and the existing plms of the United King- 
dom, the Netherim& and the Federal Republic of Germany, are admirable in their darity and 
detail, they d e r  from two major flaws. In general, plans are designed to handle only one 
type of mident--a dearly defined release Neither the slowly deve lom accident, where the 
possibility of a major release is unaertain, nor the unexpected and irnrnedih catastmphic 
release are induded in any comprehensive way. 
The second flaw is that inherent in the plans reviewed here, indudmg the IAEA recorn 
mendations, is the assumption that all procedures will work more or less smoothly. Thus for 
example, if emmgency telephone lines exist between the Emergency Control Room and off-site 
authorities, it is assumed that meaningful co-cations will be tmnsmitted Little thought is 
given to the possible human problems 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS ACCID ENTS 
Lessons learned from the TM I accident should be treated with caution as the next 
&dent will not be the same as TM I, and the emergency organization of any Empean counby 
is importantly different from those organizations in the U S  Y el. the TM I accident revealed a 
type of nudear aaident not anticipated in the plans studied to date: a confusing, slowly 
develoFing accident with resu1tu-g uncertainty about current and future plant status. This type , 
of mident could happen in a Eumpean countryr thus, emergency plans should be designed tr, 
handle such a occurrence. 
One of the most recurrent findings in the documents examined (President's Commission 
1979; Rogovin 1979: US N udear Regulatory Commission 1979a-c) was the need for an 
appropriate oganization for the opemtor team. The operators must be p s e n t e d  with dear, 
well-organized, and screened information in a non-dishdmg errvironmenl. with a well-defined 
chain of common informmiion so- and sinks The European authorities are better prem 
in this respect; yet some kmghts can be gained from the US recommendations. 
The operators should be able to concentrate on stabilizing the reactor and mrnprehendmg 
the system status All other accidznt. mamgement opations should be kept separate-- 
physically, amustically, md organizationally (Rogovin 1979). 
C o ~ d o n s  weTe a seriom problem at TMI. largely because the plant status was not 
well understood. There were no summary dffaiptors that could be used to desQibe the t e rn -  
cal situation On this subjed, most of the lessons and recommendations included in the 
Kemeny (*dent's Commission 1979) and Rogovin (1979) reports were parhcular to the US 
oganizalions involved The following general lessons can, however, be gleaned fmrn the 
repoh 
(i) Information sources should be cleady spedfied, includmg who mllects what infor 
rnafion on-site and off-slte as well as who coordinates off-site data collection rxkivi- 
ties 
(ii) lnforrnation disseminuon to off-site cgencies and the rr.edia should be cltix-ly 
specified and conduct€. by appmpnately tr-aiied people. The European plans seem 
especially weak in this regad 
(iii) The people involved should be appropriately b e d  
The concept of keeping opemtor and non-operator d v i t i e s  sepmte applies as well to the 
operabr team. Lines of responsibility should be dearly laid out including the lines between 
the shift supmvisor and the shift technical advisor. 
Many of the above organizaiional measures presume a long-term accident such as the one 
at TM I. Yet these me- must not be taken in such a way as to degrade the effectiveness 
of emergency operations in the case of a short-term accident 
TM I pesznted a dear need for unambiguous emergency pcedures to deal with abnormal 
operalions and a pooliy understood plant status Emergency procedures must be cleariy 
defined even in the face of great uncertainty (US N RC 1979b). 
A cenM problem in emergency planning is maintaining operator preparedness (Otway et 
al. 1980). One solution often mentioned is the use of improved simulator f i n i n g  and of 
repeated simulator experience, w e d  to include accidents involving multiple czauses mrnplex 
transients and long-term developments (Rogovin 1979). A nother measure is plant drills for 
the same types of amidents with dosely watched o p e d r  paformance and opemtor rewards 
for good performance (US N RC 1979b). 
COMM UKICATIONS BETW EEh THE OPERATOR A N D  THE 
OUTSIDE WORLD: THROUGH THE CONTROL ROOM WALL 
The comrrlunication links between the operators in the w n h 1  room and those outside are 
critical to the m o t h  functioning of the emergency response. An malysls of the technical 
sources the operators call upon for assistance and the gwernrnent authorities that depend upon 
the opexabr team as a source of information for their accident management decisions are 
chosen as focal points because analyses of the experience at Three Mile Island indicate that 
communication was a central problem and because European plans also appear weak in this 
regard The report on the inveshgation by the U.S. NRC' s Office of Inspection and Enforce- 
ment ( 19794 conduded that the pcnk im of sub- t%dtnhd + to Ue maargemerd teum 
c t i r e ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ a s a . r e s u l t o f ~  . . 
dgb&es 
This report cites as a reason for this problem the f a d  that emergency planning was geared 
to those major accidents where events occur very quiddy--as are the European plans I t  may be 
that in these countries lines of duty are not so well defined and oommunications are possibly 
not adequate for the slowly developing aaident A t  TMI this orientation led to a lack of 
emphasis on me&anisns to mob~lize and cornrnunicate with off-site personnel. While it is 
Likely that the next nudear h d e n t  will not be lik TM I, and while there are important 
difierences in emergency organizahions between the US and Empean countries the fack 
remaim that the mle of the o p e b r  in ernergency operations may be determined by the corn 
rnunications b, and those links should be examined for their effectiveness in the unexpected 
accident type Qscovered at TM I: a confusing, slowly-developing aoddent 
c w  . . uith T e c h i d  Snmm 
1qbnmb-n Smm jn- the 0puib-r Team 
There are several types of t edmid  resource people who mnay be useful in accident 
management Eowwer, selecdion procedures should respond to the pmblem presented in the 
Rogovin (1979) revim of the TMI accident: what is desired is one pemn  with both great 
technid expertise and complete day-bday familiarity with the plant yet few .people e>dst with 
both of those characteristics. Ths applies as well to European o ~ t i o n s .  
Apart fmm the problems of selehng and rnaintmmg the avadability of techcal  support 
staff, there are general problems of comrrmnicahon between them and the operator team The 
most important of these include: 
(i) Operator Resistance: There are sevexal reasons why the control room crew may fad 
to mrnrnunicate to the outside world as effectively as it should These include: 
technical, psychologid, procedural and incentive f&rs 
(ii) D elays: The TM I acddent showed that it is easy to underestimate the delay in corn 
munication Since accident management often m o t  afiord to wait for the appmpri- 
ate expert or desired calculation. the problem of delays in c o d c a t i o n  gives rise 
to the need to make decisions in the fa~e of great uncerlzinty. Planrung for 
dedsionmaldng under uncertainty is not adequately addressed in the emergency 
plans studied to datR 
(iii) Signal-bNoise Ratio: Another difficulty with wmmunications is brought about by 
the volume of messages passing back and forth in a confusing aaident such as the 
one at TM I. The acknowledgement and retrievable storage of information can fully 
tax the mental resources of the operator taam 
(iv) Limited Usefulness of Technical Support: The experience at TMI shows that even 
with extensive expert technical mnsultation over hours and dayx of d e l i b h o n ,  a 
great deal of uncertainty in system  stat^^^ persistmi S e y d  k y  areas of misunder 
stan* or lack of underxtandmg pe- for days at TM I,  even with a veritable 
army of A merica's best techniaal minds assembled at the site 
In the case of nudear &dents, the decisions made by government authorities include 
both the choice of which auntermeasures to implement (shelter, evamahon, thyroid blockerg 
waming, no d o n )  rs well as the &oie  of where it should be unplemented (radius, sector). 
Risks and costs are associated with inqdementing a wuntameesme whether or not a release 
o m ,  just as there ai-e risks for not implernentmg countameasures if a release does occur. 
Thus, the decision to order a muntermeasure involves a balancing of social and political risks 
and wsts. This is usually complicated by the f a d  thai Wnical experts and government 
authorities, both with Lirmted expertise, m involved 
I t  is usually assumed that an &dent can be defined in tams of a release; the operator's 
duty is to assess the severity of this release and with this informahon the responsible authorities 
can order the apppriate muntermeasures. I t  is ~mportant, however. thak these guides would 
not help a operator l m d  with the situation enmuntered at TM I ,  where a h y h g e n  bubble was 
discovered in the core T h s  accident shows that countermeasure deasions may have to be 
made in the faae of greai uncertainty. The critical question which has not been addressed is 
how the operator can communimk t h ~ s  uncertainty. 
P d  of the philosophy of emergency procedure design and aaident prevention should be 
based upon past elcperience. Though wery effort should be made to prevent recurrence of past 
&dents, it would be irrespnsible to acknowledge that not every fdure  which is a psCiori 
obvious a u l d  have been obvious a p-bri New regulations stemming from past experience 
tend b deal with a w e l l - s t r u b d  problem defmed and revealed by the acddent, rather than 
the ill-structured problem existug before the went. 
Bemuse the situation before the went is often ill-struchued a first warty is to counteract 
the problem of information overload on the operator. For h s  purprlse, &dent management 
information a u l d  be ranked and screened so that only the mst important and appmpriak 
information gets b the operator team, with the rest of the information shunted to data 
remrders and support group ; in dffer-en t rooms A second problem introduced above, is that of 
coping with a pooriy strudul ~d and uncertain situation How does the opel-ator convey an unc- 
ertain plant status to outnde authorities? 
One possibhty suggesb zd by a gmwing school of thought on the use of probabilistic infor 
mation, is to train the oper ator in the use of subjective probabdity. Ideally, the operator or 
technical experts could expr e s  their state of knowledge concerning plant or accident status in 
terms of a set of subjective I xobabilities. The govemrnent authorities could, in tum, be briefed 
on the use of these pro& tlitig specifically in how they translate into action. This scheme, 
though smple enough on p qxr, would probably not work in an &dent sibahon since in the 
midst of an accident, the o p  ?&r tern pbab ly  could not meaninefully set subjective pmbabil- 
ities; and government autho~ rities m o t  be expected to understand and be cornlortable enough 
with subjective pmbabdities to combine such information appropriately with social and political 
value mforrnalion to come tc an appropriate countameasure decision 
As a possible way a m  und this difixxlty, this predekrmined language could have as a 
vocabulary, not pmbabiitie, , but simple key- words or colors ("condition red'') or numbers and 
these keywords could be asst xiated with. say, from three to ten standard pamgraphs. 
Ideally, this h d d  I Language System (SLS) would induce the operator to move from 
very coarse aspxts of systei rn status to a particular pragraph For this purpose, the rnappmg 
from system sbtm to pmgr aph must be unambiguous The operator could then be held liable 
if, for instance, he bansnit s a partrcular plant status inmmztly, since post-&dent h e m  
could reasonably detamine that he should have been able to assess it correctly. The SLS also 
relieves the operator of SOIT 1e of his responsibility, in that he can ref= to the mapping guide- 
lines using the SL$ he is cz dled upon to exemse his judgment less 
Ideally, the SLS woulc 1 also induce the government authority to act upon the paqmph 
received with a partrcular cc ~untexmeasure. Given the pagmph received and extenuating r i r  
cxmstmce~ the authority m .& feel that only one or two countermeasures could be justified in 
post-&dent hearings The authority is also relieved of some of its responsibility, ince it can 
cite the paragraph given as p artial justification of the decision 
The SLS allows the st cucbmd "predgestion" of very difficult judgements and dedsions 
that could not be made well in the heat of an accident The net effect would be to decrease arl 
hoc human judgments in aa ident management rephang them with more m f u l l y  considered 
judgments. The SLS would I also p v i d e  an appropriate menue for openness and so would 
help prevent the loss of cn edibility that so ooinphcnted the TMI &dent. F i y ,  the SLS 
would build into the amidel ~t management system a pre-determined means of d e s a i b i  and 
reading to a v a y  uncertain I lant status both current and f u h .  
0 ne would expect, ho- wever. some difliculties in the development of an SL $ including 
keeping the mapping from ,-stem parameters to pamgmphs simple enough to be appropriate for 
a h s s  situation; keeping i t general enough to allow for mexpeded events; keepii  it of a 
manageable size; formulatin g clearly defined system status to ac4ion response; and keeping it 
up-to-date. 
PRINCIPLES FOR ASSISTI. N G  NUCLEAR A CClD E.3T 
M A N A G E M E N T  OPERATI ONS 
Basic principle points l :o be followed in planning for nuclear amident management can be 
gleaned from the preceding. They are viewed from the perspective of th.e operator. The princi- 
ple that. underiies all the ou >em is that all p l v  efforts should be &EM toward reducing 
the mfotmation processing I .oad canied by each pemn involved in rmmagbg an accident A 
lesson learned from previot JS accidents is that there is a very large m u n t  of information 
requiring rapid and appmpn iate response. The individual ~nf ormalion pcessing load c3an be 
r educd  substarltially by two planning nmsures 
(i) by giving each person a clear and specific mle w i h n  a well-understood mformation 
pmcessing structllre; 
(ii) by antici- as many accident rnanagernent deasions as possible in the planning 
pmcess. 
Thus, rvd-time, ad hoc dedsion rnakmg can be reserved for unexpected fedures of the 
&dent These fundamentals form the basis for a further elght more specific principles. 
5. A c c i d e n t ~ ~ s h o u l d b e s e k & f o r o m b n a e t e c h . r c d c a l C c r m u l e @ , ~ ~  
l5anbj m z d c t l m l h w ~  
6. O p m k n s  caad other decisionnuka dunhi be o-d a p m p u k  u-amhws . . ' &r&CiSiQILS 
7. P l D o e o h o e s s t L a r l d b e t r w q m m t u n d - e r n m M -  
CONCLUSIONS 
In addition to the phciples listed above, other general remarks can be made here in 
srnmary form 
A study of several non-nudear accidents found that there are broad sirnil~ties in the 
structure and dweloprnent of q o r  acddents. This is a very important findmg, as the key 
problem in Panning for nuclear &dents is that they are extremely rare. 
A second conchion is that infomtion management plays a centcal role in acddent 
management The cues preceeding an accident rise out of a badqpund of inconsequential 
fluchations in performartoe. Their eariy identification, then, is a signal detection pmblern 
Even after identification, the &dent management problem can be cfiaracterized as an info- 
tion pmcessing pmblem: the attempt to & apppiak ly  to a very large amount of info- 
tion in a short time 
The mst basic and important mnclusion arises fm a mrrpxison of the accident at Three 
M ile Island in the US, and the plans for nudear accidents in some European nations Current 
plans do not appear to @an adeqyately for poorly undedmd. slowly develom &dents 
where there is a great deal of u n d t y  about the current and future stat;us of the syskrn 
This is in part due to the fa& that it is extremely difkdt to plan for a rare event, and to verify 
that the planning is adequate. Past ddents .  seen through the lens of hindsight are typically 
studied as a well-structured series of events. Future aoidents, as represented in drills, are mi- 
cally represented again in a well-stru*d manner. A n a d a l  future &dent may well be di- 
structured and poorly understood That uncertainty led to great diacultes in corxmmmcations 
and decision making. 
Cleariy, accident paning should help operators cope with unczhinty of the sort experi- 
enced at TM I. Yet a study of past US and some European plans finds that they have been 
based on the assuqhon that a serious accident would be initiated by a recognizable and dis- 
tinct event that gives, at least a confident and low bound to the maximum release in the near 
future Accidents in those plans are chamhized in t e r n  of doses, countemasures are then 
dictated at partidar dose levels The plans do not seem d e n t  b the confusion and unce r  
tainty of a poorly undemtood accident Past midents how that individuals have difTiadties in 
recognizing, cornphendmg, and dealng with an accident espedaJly so when a great deal of 
uncertainty is irrvolved A standardized 1-e, all designed to help cope wi& uncertainty, is 
req- That aspect OF nuclear mident management does not *Far to be adequately 
addressed in the plans studid 
It is possible to draw together certain conclusions wh& may be useful in the werltual 
formulation of recornmendaborxi To revert to the flushtion of accidents laid out in the intro- 
duction these latter would represent some of the 'hew noxmsJ' of Phase VI.  In summary, the 
conclusions are: 
1. Accidents, nuclear or other, can be argued to have common chamderistics and 
structure. 
2. This struckme allows certain a o ~ t i v e  o ~ S € ! N ~ ~ ~ O I I S  to be made, partidarty with 
respect to comrnunicalions. 
3. Effective, though appp-iately limikd. communications a-e vital to the handlmg of 
&dent situations. 
4 The efficiency of the apppriate aornrnunications depends upon a aornplex of 
f &rs-institutional and administrative, social and psychological. 
5. Recognition that &dents may o m  outside the premnceived band of possible 
chamderistics and structures is necessary. 
6. Use may be made of the T M I  &dent experience to improve existing European 
wntingency plans in oertain areas 
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I. INTROD UCT ION 
This paper is concerned with aspects of otganization and procdm in nuclear aaident 
rnanagement I n  address% this topic, recourse is made to the lessons leamed from the rnore 
general field of technologically derived &dents--someh~es r e f m d  to zi man-made disasters. 
This a p p a r h  is valid for two reasons FkAly, the majority of organizations which mrnprise 
the mfmstn1ctur-e for management of &dents from outside the "boundary fence" are largely 
identical for all aaidents Smndly, a detailed study of a wide variety of technologwally 
dtspate accidents tias shown that a general wolutionary process associated with serious 
auiderits can be identified (T umer 1978). T  hough no substimtial erase-remrd for major nudear 
aaidents exists to date, there is no a pum reason to suppose that nuclear technology should 
not show these same geneml features Indeed, the record of those few nudear accidents which 
have o m d  supports this hypothesis. 
In the first part of h s  study we analyze various phases of mident waluation and accident 
rnanagernent W e attempt. in the semnd pa& to poirlt to some procedural and organizational 
measures which are l k l y  to be parbo-llarly unportmt to operations during a nuclear accident 
For this purpose, we shall review e x i m  European plans rnalang reference to the accident at 
Three Mile Island (TMI) in the United States (US), in order to identify the roles of the 
different p u p s  involved. Special con-%ddon will be given to the relationship between utility 
opemtors and technically oornpetent external bodies for the TM I and other midents 
The EzoELctianoJAccidnts and l ? u + M i m a p m d  
Current planring tends to akhibute a somewhat unique chancter to nudear &dents pay- 
ing perhaps too little a n t i o n  to the fact that in the wider mntext of the technologid wodd 
common featmes conspire from time to time to cause accidents. A broader, generic approach 
to accidents should thus be hdzuctive. 
One important featum common pehaps to all technologies is that in aaident planning 
and investigation the engineer's thinking may dominate. Interpretations have been almost 
exclusively tedmically oriented with only s a l t  attention given to ,social and administdive 
=P=ts. 
Disasters other than those arising from natural forces or sabotage are not created over 
night It is rare that an individual, by virtue of a simple e m r  can cause an acddent in a system 
formerly believed to be relatively seam. Though the majority of examinations of the long- 
term development of aaiden ts have supposed them to origirmte 'in a bolt from the blue A 
reant  examination (Turner 1978) of the origins of 86 m - m a d e  disasters stresses a broad con- 
textual f rarnework oonsisting c)f the followmg six phases 
-- a notionally n o d  starting point; 
-- an inmbation period: 
-- a precipitating event; 
-- the onset of effects or consequenczs; 
-- rescue ~ ! d  salvage; and 
-- full systemic readjustment to the surprise assodated with the precipitating a& 
These phases are Uustmted in Figure 1. Of special interest is the beginning at point "a," 
which is where aberrant events begin to a m u l a t e  unnotic~d The incubation period ends at 
"b," where a preciptahng incident produces a transformation, revealing the &nt underlying 
strudure. A situation which had been presumed to have one set of properties is now reveaied 
as having different and additional pruprties Attention is usually focused on the precipitating 
event because of its immediate characteristics and ansequences This makes it almost inevit- 
able that the general perception of the aberrant events in the incubation period will be 
mochfied Yet if appropriately sensitive monitoring devices and techniques are used, it may be 
that sensory evidence of the incubation can be built u p  Nonetheless, measures designed to 
indicate the onset of an accident or to deal with its development will not provide help in antici- 
pating latent faults. 
To prevent accidents we need to be aware of the appropriate time of eadn p i n t  in the 
incubahon network so that: 
-- ambiguities om be clanfiec1; 
- information is not overiookeced; 
- information for c ~ n t r o h g  mmpiex situations is provided, and 
-- informahon neecled to foresee "unknown" situations LS at hand 
Unfortunately not all of these requirements can be wholly fulf-ed For this reason. during the 
course of an acdd.ent, it is necessary to djust continuously for the d i s m ~ n c i e s  between what 
the di..;aster plan envisaged rmd what is really happening. 
A Need lo E'mm the Fmhakbn Piwe 
A aiderlt. inquiries can be useful for establishmg patterns of appropriate communication 
and poirlts for intervention Authorihes malung these inquiries are g e n e d y  concerned with 
the behavior of and decisions of individuals and organizations contributmg to the event in quep 
tion as well as to the technical, social, and administmtive changes needed to prevent a 
reclma?ce. However, remrnmendations resulting from these inquiries have often imposed 
ovedy stringent and inoperable a~nditions on the institutions concerned This has, in turn, 
resultEd from a failure to understand the Incubation Phase. 
The problem of understan&% the origins of accidents is essentially that of identifymg 
events unanticipated by those pursuing orderiy objectives. The problems of explajntng the 
events preceeding and surrounding accidents are those of amounting for biases and inadequzr 
cies iri habitual ways of dealmg with infomntion relahg to the impending accident Geneml 
recognition of the need for a new interpretation of the situation is usually produced by the 
immediate p h ~ c a l  cham~teristics of the pdpi tahng event, which may be purely human or 
purely technical ( i n i i ve )  --as when an explosion fire, or a cmsh ocrrus, or a component finally 
breaks. Finally, the precipitating everit has links with many of the causes of aberrant events in 
the inalbi~tion period since just ;is a positive organizatonal achievement requires a &:in of 
mmd acts and decidorls if it is to be of any sigruficanoe, a large accident reyires an extensive 
chain or errors. A sunple error Iccading to a simple accident is rearlily explicable, traceable, and 
unders2anrlable; however, largesale clisruphons are usually not caused by a simple e m r  but. by 
an accllmulatiorl of simple errors 
A Need to E m  the J'recphkirg cam! 
Rmdiqj  E ' c t s  PRoses 
This chain of precipitating errom indudes nol only teclylical failures in mformaho11 flows, 
comrnunicahon channels organizahonal structures ~md permme1 motivations. A brief oLPer- 
view of tf-ie general problems is presented now. The: rerrinder of tl-is reporl w-dl co~centrate 

on Ulc r:lore specd-ic pblerns  involved in nudear-accident preparedness in the mnlcut of U.Z. 
and European experiences 
 he f i r s t  p r o b l e m  c o n c e r n s  t h e  r o l e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  
a c c i d e n t  a s s e s s m e n t  a n d  r e s p o n s e ,  
why it is not fully appreciated or unaeel.stood Information may not be completely appreciated 
because individuals p u p s ,  or institutions have a false sense of security or vulnerability when 
faced with danger signs. Pressure of work for other distndions draw their attention away from 
the emerging signs of danger. They may distrust. the source from which the waxning wmes 
They are sometimes decoyed intD concentrating upon one p p e r t y  of a phenomenon and so 
relegating its other features D ifficulties arise, b o ,  in dassifying the phenomenon and in decid- 
ing upon a suitable course of d o n .  Plant operators m y  have difficulty in identifying the 
information providing went amongst a mass of irrelevant material. Sometimes there is the 
added difbdty of mnvincing those in power of the validity of the information F'requerltly the 
available information is not assembled in the apppr iak  form or place. 
To assemble information which should pass among different organizations and institu- 
tions use may have b be made of non-routine, non-institutional pattaTls of mmmunimbon 
W here wrmmurlidon itself sets up barriers to the flow of information, these baniers rnay be 
such that they rnake it irrrpossible to stop the d i d r  occurring. 0 f <nurse, it is impossible and 
undesirable for everyone to comrnunirrite werythmg to everyone el.%, but. due attention must 
be paid to the screens through which ulformation flow is essentially filtered I t  is espeddly 
important to rec~gnize that often, indimduals are reluctant to adrnit the existence of a ptenhal 
aaident situation 
A sxond general problem concerns the organization effidency of the respndmg institu- 
tion Part of the effectiveness of any organization lies in the way it is able b involve its 
members with suffidcnt similarity of approach, outlook and piorities to operate more effiaerltly 
than would a group of unorganized indviduals. Yet. there remains the danger of ool.ledive 
blinkers maslang important issues, referred to by advomks of numerical. risk analyses as ''the 
rogue went" When a pemasive and structured set of beliefs biases the knowl.edge and 














































